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ABSTRACT 
 
Charity, since the Reformation, has been secularised to the extent that the continued use by 
the courts of analogies to a four hundred year old statute in order to determine charitable 
purpose with respect to tax exempt status, is giving rise to absurd situations.  Tax exempt 
status is generally assigned by an agent of the government, for example the Inland Revenue 
Department in New Zealand, without any evaluation of the impact of the activities of the 
charitable organisation on social or economic policies. 
 
It is only when the activities of the charitable organisation are challenged in the courts, that 
the charitable organisation may lose its privileged position.  From this brief analysis, it can be 
seen that the situation which is developing is a classic case of 'putting the cart before the 
horse'.  A recent New Zealand case demonstrates the folly of assigning tax exempt status 
without first having examined the charitable purposes of the trust, and without having 
conjointly undertaken an evaluation of the social and economic impact of that charitable 
organisation.  It is apparent that there is a need for substantial changes in charity law, with 
respect to charitable purpose and fiscal issues, in today's social and economic climate. 
 
THE SECULARISATION OF CHARITY 
 
This paper discusses the definition of charity, and the nature of the relationship of "charitable 
purpose" and "tax preferences".  In so doing, I find that it is inappropriate for tax exemptions 
to be provided to charitable organisations purely on the basis of their stated charitable 
purpose, without any prior evaluation of the social and economic effects of their activities, nor 
monitoring of their activities once tax exempt status has been approved. 
 
The concept of charity, which I consider to be a thing of beauty, subliminal, spiritual, 
untainted, without thought of self has, since the introduction of the Statute of Elizabeth in 
1601, evolved as a consequence of judicial interpretation into a secular fiscal tool.  I wish to 
suggest that instead of continuing to broaden the concept of charitable purpose to absurd 
lengths, humanitarian needs should be thought of as the sole basis of charitable activity. The 
judiciary have, throughout the course of history, declared what shall be a charitable purpose 
while at the same time refraining from defining "charity" in legal terms.  It may be argued that 
this is a consequence of the state of England's religious beliefs at the time of Henry VIII, and 
that charitable purpose has Protestant overtones.  If England had remained a Catholic nation 
it is arguable that the law of charity today would be uniquely distinct from that as it now 
stands.   
 
Brady argues that1: "… the great statute on charitable uses was in many ways the highwater 
mark of Tudor secularism."  Blakeney states that2:  "… contrary to its avowed policy of even-
handedness, the English law relating to religious charities exhibits a Protestant bias." In 
Gilmour v Coats3 their Lordships, notably unanimously, held that a gift to a Roman Catholic 
priory did not establish a valid charitable trust because the purposes of that priory did not 
demonstrably confer a benefit upon the public.  Gifts to all Roman Catholic Orders in 
England were void as being opposed to public policy until the passing of the Roman Catholic 
Relief Act 1832.4  Thirty-nine years were to pass before this legislation was to be tested in 
the question of a gift to a contemplative order.5  A testatrix had directed that her property, 
                                                          
1  J C Brady, "Some problems touching upon the nature of bequests for Masses in Northern Ireland," (1968), 
19(357) Northern Ireland Quarterly, 357, cited in M Blakeney, "Sequestered Piety and Charity - A 
Comparative Analysis," (1981) 2(3) The Journal of Legal History, 207 at 209. 
2  M Blakeney,  "Sequestered Piety and Charity - A Comparative Analysis," (1981) 2(3) The Journal of Legal 
History, 207at 207. 
3  Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426. Ibid, at p.215. 
4  Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829, s.37 cited in Blakeney, above n 2, p.213. 
5  Blakeney, above n 2, p.213. 
 Centre of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies  Working Paper No. CPNS7 
 
2  
real and personal, be sold and after meeting certain legacies, the  proceeds were to be 
distributed in equal shares between two specified convents, the Sisters of Charity of St. Paul 
at Selley Oak, and the Dominican Convent at Carisbrooke.6  In this case,7 the Vice-
Chancellor, Sir John Wickens, held the first bequest to be valid, as the Sisters of Charity 
were "… a voluntary association for the purpose of teaching the ignorant and nursing the 
sick." The second bequest was ruled as8: 
 
… not being able  to be upheld as charitable … [the Dominican order of nuns being] a 
voluntary association of women for the purpose of working out their own salvation by 
religious exercises and self-denial  … [and had] none of the requisites of a charitable 
institution, whether the word charitable is used in its popular sense or in its legal sense. 
(Wickens) 
 
In Ireland, where Roman Catholicism is the established religion, gifts to contemplative orders 
of nuns are treated differently.9 This was illustrated by Gavan Duffy J who based his decision 
on the pre-reformation law,10 when discussing the question of a gift to found "… a Convent of 
Perpetual Adoration11 in Lisnaskea or elsewhere, his Honour12:  
 
… perfunctorily declared that it is a shock to one's sense of propriety and a grave 
discredit to the law that there should, in this Catholic country, be any doubt about the 
validity of a trust to expend money in founding a Convent for the perpetual adoration of 
the Blessed Sacrament. (Duffy) 
 
In Re Sheridan,13 which was concerned with a gift for a Carmelite Convent, Dixon J in 
following Maguire v Attorney General14 held the gift to be charitable, and took the opportunity 
to indicate that the reasoning in Gilmour v Coats15 was inapplicable to Irish law.  As Blakeney 
observed16: 
 
The Irish case law is interesting in highlighting the legal result of a consideration of the 
charitable status of contemplative orders of nuns in a jurisdiction in which the courts 
make no apology for displaying a Roman Catholic bias in their analyses, and in which 
they have arrived at a position which is opposite to that in England in which no religious 
bias is declared to be present in judicial decisions.  The critical distinction between the 
two jurisdictions is the English requirement of a demonstrable public benefit, which the 
Irish decisions suggest is a post-Reformation innovation and hence not as even-
handed as the English courts maintain. (Blakeney) 
 
                                                          
6  Ibid, at p.213. 
7  Cocks v Manners 1871 LR 12 Eq at 585. Ibid, at p.213. 
8  Blakeney, above n 2, p.213-4. 
9  Ibid, at p.217. 
10  Ibid, at p.218. 
11  Perpetual adoration of the Blessed Sacrament is "a form of devotion whereby arrangements are made, 
necessarily by a community, for an unbroken succession of persons to be present in private prayer and in 
contemplation before the Blessed Sacrament exposed to the view of worshippers." [1943] IR 238 cited in 
Blakeney, above n 2, p.218. 
12  Maguire v Attorney General [1943] IR 238 cited in Blakeney, above n 2, p.218. 
13  Re Sheridan [1957] IR 257 cited in Blakeney, above n 2, at p.219. 
14  Maguire v Attorney General [1943] IR 238 cited in Blakeney, above n 2, p.219. 
15  Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426 cited in Blakeney, above n 2, p.219. 
16  Blakeney, above n 2, p. 220. 
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Blakeney tested his hypothesis, that the English courts were prejudiced by the influence of 
Protestantism when considering bequests for religious purposes, in a jurisdiction in which 
neither Anglicanism nor Catholicism was the established religion, that jurisdiction being none 
other than the Commonwealth of Australia.17  Blakeney found that18: 
 
… interesting possibilities are now raised by the Australian High Court's declaration in 
Parker v R19  and a line of succeeding authorities,20 that it no longer considers itself 
bound by the decisions of the House of Lords, and by the High Court's more recent 
declaration in Viro v R.21 that it does not even consider itself obliged to follow decisions 
of the Privy Council. (Blakeny) 
 
Blakeney considers that22: "It may now be possible for that court as a 'neutral' tribunal to 
render a decision on the charitable nature of gifts to contemplative orders of nuns 
untrammelled by religious predispositions." 
 
'CHARITY' DEFINED 
 
'Charity,' therefore, or its adjectival derivative, 'charitable purpose', has been defined 
according to the religious influence of the determining jurisdiction, whether it be of a secular 
or non-secular character.  Returning to my earlier assertion, the use of the derivative of the 
concept of charity is an abuse of the English language, charitable purpose being what a 
particular jurisdiction wants it to be, without reference to the origins of the word, nor its 
concept in religion.  The judiciary have not developed a philosophy or concept of charity in 
determining charitable purpose, preferring instead to continue developing analogies to the 
Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth 1601. 
 
The origins of the concept of 'charity' are late Old English, in the sense of "…Christian love of 
one's fellows', which is derived in turn from the Old French charite, the root being the Latin 
caritas, from carus, meaning 'dear'."23  The New Oxford Dictionary of English defines it in an 
archaic sense as "love of humankind, typically in a Christian context: faith, hope and 
charity."24 As a noun, 'charity' and its plural 'charities' refers to those organisations "… set up 
to provide help and [to] raise money for those in need" (emphasis added).25  The New Oxford 
Dictionary of English refers to its use as a mass noun, as being "… the voluntary giving of 
help, typically in the form of money, to those in need" (emphasis added).26  The adjective 
'charitable' means "…of, or relating to, the assistance of those in need, [or of being] an 
organisation or activity … officially recognised as [being] devoted to the assistance of those 
in need" (emphasis added).27    
 
The emphasis and common thread throughout the definition contained within the New Oxford 
Dictionary of English is of  "those in need" (emphasis added).   How is it, then, that today it is 
permissible to register, in New Zealand at least, the following organisations as a charitable 
trust which qualifies for tax preferences, with the approval of the Inland Revenue 
                                                          
17  Ibid, at p. 220. 
18  Ibid, at p. 223. 
19  Parker v R (1963) 111 CLR 610. Ibid, at p.223. 
20  For example, Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd  (1966) 117 CLR 
118. 
21  Viro v R. (1978) 18 ALR 257 cited in Blakeney, above n 2, p.223. 
22  Blakeney, above n 2, p.223.  
23  The New Oxford Dictionary of English, (ed. Judy Pearsall), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p.307.  
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid. 
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Department: a trust to promote the adoption of racing horses;28 a veterinary science 
scholarship;29 a dancing association;30 and a floral society?31  It is not intended to criticise 
the activities of those organisations, as no doubt they provide, within the secular definition of 
"charitable purpose," a role for the "benefit of the public."  The functions of such 
organisations, however, are well-removed from the pure concept of charity as defined for 
those in need, yet they sit side-by-side in the register of entities which benefit from the 
unique status of being tax exempt and of conferring pecuniary gains to those who contribute 
financially to their activities.  
 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMISSIONERS FOR SPECIAL PURPOSES OF THE 
INCOME TAX V PEMSEL32 
 
It is useful to review the key elements of the pronouncement by Lord MacNaghten in this 
preeminent case, as the effects down the centuries have been, and continue to be, far-
reaching. Every Income Tax Act, Lord MacNaghten stated, which had been in force since 
1842, had contained an exemption in favour of property dedicated to charitable purposes.33  
However, what charitable purpose might be within the meaning of those Acts was not defined 
by the legislature.34  In 1887 or 1888, according to Lord MacNaghten, the Board of Inland 
Revenue discovered that35: "… the meaning of the legislature was not to be ascertained from 
the legal definition of the expressions actually found in the statute, but was to be gathered 
from the popular use of the word "charity"." Lord MacNaghten also stated that36: "No doubt 
the popular meaning of the words 'charity' and 'charitable' does not coincide with their legal 
meaning … and no one as yet has succeeded in defining the popular meaning of the word  
'charity'." 
 
This latter statement seemed to me to have been an extraordinary testimony for such an 
eminent person as Lord MacNaghten to make, and I wish to explore the background to his 
Honour's statement. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (OED) 
 
Today, if I wish to ascertain the meaning of a word, I will use an acknowledged authority 
such as the well-known Oxford English Dictionary (OED).  In 1891, as I have learnt, the OED 
did not exist.  It seems that the achievements of the compilers of the dictionaries of the time, 
while today acknowledged as being distinguished lexicographical works, were but a step 
towards the creation of a truly great work, which was ultimately the Oxford English 
Dictionary.37 
  
Thirty-five years prior to Pemsel's case, in November 1857 at a meeting of the Philological 
Society, Archbishop Trent, then Dean of Westminster, read a paper entitled "Some 
Deficiencies in our English Dictionaries."38  This led to a resolution on the part of that Society 
to prepare a Supplement to the dictionaries which existed at that time, containing these 
deficiencies. It soon became apparent that rather than a Dictionary-Supplement, the desired 
                                                          
28  Adopt a Standardbred (NZ) Charitable Trust, Staples Tax Guide 2001, Brookers Ltd, p.1100. 
29  Alwyn Robert Thompson Memorial Veterinary Science Scholarship, Staples Tax Guide 2001, Brookers 
Ltd, p.1101. 
30  Christchurch Tap Dancing Association, Staples Tax Guide 2001, Brookers Ltd, p.1116. 
31  Manawatu Orchid Society Inc, Staples Tax Guide 2001, Brookers Ltd, p.1151. 
32  The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531. 
33  Ibid, at 574. 
34  Ibid, at 574. 
35  Ibid, at 574. 
36  Ibid, at 583. 
37  S Winchester, The Surgeon of Crowthorne, Penguin Books, Australia, 1998, p.90. 
38  Ibid, Frontispiece. 
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objective was "… a new Dictionary worthy of the English language and of the present state of 
Philological Science."39  In 1859, a "Proposal for the publication of a New English Dictionary" 
was issued, inviting the public of England and America40:  
 
… to assist in collecting the raw materials for the work, these materials consisting of 
quotations illustrating the use of English words by all writers of all ages and in all 
senses, each quotation being made on a uniform plan on a half-sheet of notepaper, 
that they might in due course be arranged and classified alphabetically and by 
meanings. 
 
This was a monumental task, as can well be imagined, at the time.  The sequel to this appeal 
was "… that one of the most remarkable conversations in modern literary history took place 
on a cool and misty late autumn afternoon in 1896, in the small village of Crowthorne in 
Berkshire."41  The meeting was between Dr James Murray, who at that time was the editor of 
what was later to be called the Oxford English Dictionary, and an enigmatic figure named Dr 
W.C. Minor, who was among the most prolific of the thousands of volunteers whose labours 
lay at the core of the dictionary's creation.  For nearly twenty years the two men had been 
corresponding regularly about the finer points of English lexicography, but had never met, 
due to Dr Minor's reluctance to leave his home at Crowthorne in order to travel to Oxford.  As 
the task of compiling the dictionary was nearing completion, and as Dr Murray desired to 
acknowledge the valuable work done by volunteers such as Dr Minor, Dr Murray telegraphed 
his intentions to travel to Berkshire to meet with Dr Minor.  Arriving at the huge and rather 
forbidding red-brick mansion that was the home of Dr Minor, Dr Murray introduced himself to 
the person whom he assumed to be Dr Minor, only to learn, "after a brief pause, an air of 
momentary mutual embarrassment" that the man he was addressing was the Superintendent 
of the Broadmoor Asylum for the Criminally Insane.  For more than twenty years, the Asylum 
had been the residency of Dr Minor.42   
 
I commend the story of the OED to you, for this is also the story of a man who is credited 
with having made a singular contribution to that most august of publications which, when 
finally completed on New Year's Eve 1927 as the New English Dictionary, "… consisted of 
twelve volumes, 414,825 words defined, 1,827,306 illustrative quotations used, with the total 
length of type being 178 miles, comprising 227,779,589 letters and numbers."43 
 
A BRIEF EXPOSITION ON THE CONCEPT OF CHARITY 
 
Charity, as we have seen, is not the same to all people.  Therefore in attempting to define it, I 
shall undertake a brief philosophical and religious perspective of charity in order to examine 
its nature closely.  I begin with a philosophical example, to illustrate that what we think charity 
is, may not necessarily be what others believe it to be 44: 
 
So I found myself halfway between the perception of the concept of 'horse' and the 
knowledge of an individual horse … if you see something from a distance, and you do 
not understand what it is, you will be content with defining it as a body of some 
dimension.  When you come closer, you will then define it as an animal, even if you do 
not yet know whether it is a horse or an ass.  And finally, when it is still closer, you will 
be able to say it is a horse even if you do not yet know whether it is Brunellus or Niger.  
                                                          
39  Ibid, Frontispiece. 
40  Ibid, Frontispiece. 
41  Ibid, Preface. 
42  Ibid, at p.3. 
43  Ibid, at p.189. 
44 U Eco, The Name of the Rose, translated from the Italian by William Weaver, Book Club Associates, 1984.  
Originally published in Italy in 1980 under the title Il nome della rosa, Gruppe Editoriale Fabbri-Bompiani 
Sonzongno, Etas S.P.A., p.28. 
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And only when you are at the proper distance will you see that it is Brunellus (or, 
rather, that horse and not another, however you decide to call it).  And that will be full 
knowledge, the learning of the singular. (Eco) 
 
CHARITY IN RELIGION 
 
Charity, I believe, when closely examined from a religious perspective, is the empathy of 
mankind towards their fellow human beings whose 'lot in life' has been less than fortunate.  
 
CHARITY IN EASTERN RELIGION 
 
The essential element of charity is that of providing for those in need.  This philosophy is not 
the sole prerogative of Western religion, for it can be found in Eastern religions as well.  
Buddhism has an overriding emphasis on compassion, known as Bodhicitta, being that " … 
integral commitment to developing the good heart."45  Mahayana Buddhism46 states that47: 
"… the only reason to be a spiritual person is to bring benefit to others."  
 
The philosophy of charity is also evident in Islam48:  
 
The Prophet gave us the Koran, and left us just five obligations to satisfy during our 
lives.  The most important is to believe only in the one true God.  The others are to pray 
five times a day, fast during Ramadan, and to be charitable to the poor. …. The fifth 
obligation of every Muslim is pilgrimage.  We are obliged, at least once in our lives, to 
visit the holy city of Mecca. (Caelho) 
 
In the mythology of Islamic economics and theology of the East "… there are 60 verses that 
stipulate, mandate, encourage charity, discuss its virtues and rewards, [and] warn of 
punishment to those who eschew [charity]."49 
 
CHARITY IN CHRISTIANITY 
 
Fausett, in his Cyclopaedia, defines Christian charity as50:  
 
[From] the Gr. "love," "loving esteem"; Latin caritas.  The outward benefaction, or alms, 
is a mere manifestation of the inward and true charity of Scripture (1 Cor. xiii. 3): 
'Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, … and have not charity, it profiteth me 
nothing'. (Fausett) 
 
Modern humanists and many psychologists urge a more authentic love and empathy for 
one's fellow man.51  Auman states that52: " …Christ gave the mandate to love both God and 
neighbour and as a single experience of love."  Hence, "… to love another, God or man, is a 
single operation based upon a single psychodynamic principle - seeing the other as worthy of 
love … love, whether of God or man, is a single therapeutic power; it has a single function."53  
                                                          
45  B Sharples, "Something spoke to my heart," in Why Buddhism? Westerners in search of wisdom, V. 
Mackenzie, Allen and Unwin, Australia, 2001, p.99.  
46  …[being] the form of Buddhism practised in Tibet, China and Japan, for example. Ibid, at p.99. 
47  Sharples, above n 45, p.99. 
48  P Caelho, The Alchemist, Harper Perennial, 1998, at 56. 
49  www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/articles/economics/myhtology_of_islamic_economics.htm 
50  The Rev. A.R. Fausett, D.D., The Critical and Expository Bible Cyclopaedia, Hodder and Stoughton, 
London, MDCCCXCV, p.123. 
51  J Auman, O.P., "Thomistic Evaluation of Love and Charity," Extract from Angelicum, Vol. 55 (1978), at 
pp.534-556 at www.op.org/domcentral/study/auman/charity.htm 
52  Mk 12:28-31. 
53  E M Stern and B G Marino, "Psychotheology" New York/Toronto, 1970, above n 51 at p.56.  
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Auman believes that54: "It is extremely important to understand the structure and modality of 
human love if one is to grasp the meaning of the love that is charity." St. Thomas Aquinas, in 
his tract on the theological virtue of charity, debates the question of charity as friendship55: 
 
According to Aristotle56 not all love has the character of friendship, but only that love 
which goes with wishing well, namely when we so love another as to will what is good 
for him.  For if we do not will what is good to the things we love but rather, we will their 
good for ourselves, as we are said to love wine, a horse or the like, then that is not love 
of friendship but a love of desire.  For it would be foolish to say that someone has a 
friendship with wine or a horse.  As a participation in divine love, charity has God as its 
proper object, but it also enables the Christian to love God and self and neighbour the 
way God does, thus in this respect, charity utterly transcends purely human love, and 
one must rise from the psychological level to the metaphysical in order to understand 
the love of neighbour which is charity.  The love that is charity, therefore, springs from 
a source that far transcends human love … [and] achieving this, we fulfil Christ's 
supreme mandate of charity: 'Love one another as I loved you.'  (Aquinas) 
 
CHARITY IN PROVERBS 
 
Charity is also richly represented in many proverbs and sayings, as is evident from the 
following selection. 
 
"The charitable give out at the door and God puts in at the window."57 
"Charity and pride do both feedeth the poor."58 
"Charity covers a multitude of sins."59 
"Anticipate charity by preventing poverty."60 
"While society is alive and growing it will not make rigid choices between state action and 
voluntary action, but both alike will expand as the common expression of its vitality."61 
"For no sermon or admonition [on charity] is of so much avail as a deep-rooted custom."62 
"Few institutions are more ticklish than those of charity."63  
"The Waies to enrich are many, and most of the Foule.  Parsimony is one of the best, and yet 
it is not Innocent; For it with-holdeth Men from Workes of Liberality and Charity."64 
 
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN DEFINING CHARITABLE PURPOSE 
 
Today, four hundred years after Pemsel's case, the courts continue to grapple with the 
concept of charitable purpose.  This was evident in 1948, according to Owen, who stated 
that65:  "Perhaps the time had come to attempt a new definition of the legal concept of 
charitable, for neither the enumeration in the preamble to the Elizabethan Statute nor Lord 
MacNaghtens's classification in Pemsel's case established a precise line."  The debate, of 
course, continues today. 
 
                                                          
54  Auman, above n 51, p.556.  
55  Auman, above n 51, p.556.  
56  Ethics VIII, 4. 
57  The Oxford Dictionary of English Proverbs, 2nd Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1948, at p.88. 
58  Ibid, at p.88. 
59  Ibid, at p.88. 
60  Maimondes quoted in D E Owen, English Philanthropy 1660 - 1960, Oxford University Press, London, 
1965, at p.523. 
61  Nathan Report quoted in Owen, ibid, at p. 573. 
62  St. John Chrysostom quoted in Owen, above n 60, p.9. 
63  Lord Kames quoted in Owen, above n 60, p.9. 
64  Bacon's Essays, (ed Alfred S West, M.A.), University Press, Cambridge, 1926, p.106. 
65  Owen, above n 60,  p.575. 
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While it is governments which write the statutes to create charitable trusts, it is the agents of 
governments, (such as the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) in New Zealand), that approve 
the tax exempt status of charitable organisations which make such an application.  It is, 
however, the judiciary who have the task of upholding that decision, or of overturning it, when 
questions arise regarding the validity of tax exempt status accorded to certain charitable 
trusts.  Thus66:  
 
I do not think there is any comfort to be gained from definitions in this branch of law.  
We must rely, as heretofore, upon the social acumen of judges; but at the same time 
we are entitled perhaps to ask for a little more boldness in the formulation of principles.  
This is a branch of the law in which precedents lose their cogency through a change in 
social conditions, and in which analogies are frequently remote …. But I should regard 
with apprehension any attempt to confine the development of the law of charities within 
the limits of a statutory definition. (Keeton & Schwarzenberger) 
 
SUBSIDIES AND CHARITABLE PURPOSE 
 
Academics are beginning to question the logic of the decisions by the courts when 
addressing issues of charitable purpose and tax preferences.  Culyer et al state that67: "… 
the desirable distinction between the definitions of charity for the purposes of awarding legal 
and fiscal privileges is nowhere to be found in the present law." 
 
This is illustrated by two events in New Zealand in recent months, which have both 
addressed the relationship between government subsidies and charitable purpose.  The first 
is an IRD discussion document entitled "Tax and charities" (the discussion document).68  The 
second is a High Court case under the Tax Administration Act 1994.69 
 
"TAX AND CHARITIES": A NZ GOVERNMENT DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 
 
The release of the discussion document has been very timely in terms of my research 
towards my post-graduate qualifications.  My main concern in preparing my submission on 
the discussion document was that it soon became apparent to me that it was not dissimilar to 
previous reviews undertaken in New Zealand in that they all fail, in my opinion, to address in 
any substantial depth, the underlying issues of the activities of charitable organisations in 
New Zealand.70   
 
The discussion document has caused considerable consternation amongst charities in New 
Zealand, particularly the suggestion that tax relief could possibly be a form of government 
subsidy of the sector. The New Zealand Christian Council for Social Services (NZCCSS) 
consider that71: "… tax-exempt status is a priviledge (sic) [and NZCCSS] do not see the 
support the government gives through the tax system as a subsidy."  This appears to be a 
commonly held view, judging from comments at a Forum held in Christchurch to debate the 
discussion document.72  A possible explanation may be that an in-depth knowledge of the 
                                                          
66  Current Legal Problems, (eds GW Keeton and G Schwarzenberger), 1949, 2, p.102. 
67  A J Culyer, J Wiseman and J W Posnett, "Charity and Public Policy in the UK - The Law and the 
Economics" (1976) 10(1) Social and Economic Administration, 37. 
68  "Tax and charities," Policy Advice Division, Inland Revenue Department (NZ), June 2001 at 
www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz . 
69  Crown Forestry Rental Trust v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, High Court, Wellington, New Zealand, 
CP No. 127/99 and CP No. 221/99, 7 August 2001, O'Regan J.  The decision is being appealed : Appeal on 
$40m tax bill, The Press, 7 September 2001 at p.7. 
70  A copy of the author's submission is available on request to mjgousmett@xtra.co.nz  
71  Undated Memo to Members of NZCCSS. 
72  The Forum was held on Friday 20 July at the Centre for the Blind Hall, and was chaired by a representative 
of the New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations (NZFVWO), and conducted by a panel 
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economic workings of the sector is not a prerequisite to either employment or voluntary 
Board membership within the sector.  In comparison, directors of public companies, more 
likely than not, would be members of the New Zealand Institute of Directors, and would be 
expected to have a comprehensive knowledge of the sector of which those companies were 
a part.  Trustees on the Boards of New Zealand educational institutions, from pre-school to 
secondary, are similarly required to complete a course of study on assuming their 
responsibilities following their election to the Boards by the public.   
 
SUBSIDY THEORY 
 
What then are the arguments for tax relief as a government subsidy?  Brody states that73: 
"Under the classic conception of [the] 'quid-pro-quo' [subsidy theory] approach, the state 
bestows tax exemption in recognition of charities' lessening the burdens of government."  
Surrey74 provides an answer in his seminal 1970 paper which was described by Bittker as75: 
"The most systematic presentation of the subsidy theory."  Surrey argues that76: "…the tax 
incentive is generally inferior to the direct subsidy as a means of achieving social goals."  
Thus by implication, tax incentives are an indirect subsidy of the sector.   
 
Rather than become engaged in debate on the pros and cons of direct expenditure vis-à-vis 
tax incentives, this paper focuses on tax incentives per se.  Nevertheless, it would be useful 
to define certain terms.  Surrey defines tax incentives as77: "… tax expenditure[s] which 
induce certain activities or behaviour in response to the monetary benefit available."  This 
definition introduces another discipline to the debate, that of the psychology of human 
behaviour with respect to altruism, or philanthropy.78  Therefore, if a subsidy is not intended 
by government "to induce certain activities or behaviour" then those charities in New 
Zealand, who do not believe that tax relief is a subsidy, being indifferent to such subsidies, 
presumably would have no objection to their removal.  If this is the case, the New Zealand 
Government, which in 1999 paid $NZ79 million in rebates to some 491,000 donors to 
charities,79 will be able to redirect such expenditure as part of its social policy direct 
expenditure programmes. 
 
Surrey also states that80: "… many of the tax expenditures81 were expressly adopted to 
induce action which Congress considered in the national interest" (emphasis added). Further, 
Surrey states that82: "… many sponsors of tax incentives simply assume that if the benefit 
sought is helpful to them in reaching a desired result, the incentive is in the public interest." 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of representatives from Treasury, Fundraising Institute of New Zealand (FINZ), New Zealand Council of 
Christian Social Services (NZCCSS) and the NZFVWO. 
73  E Brody, "Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption"(1998) The Journal of 
Corporation Law, 587. 
74  S S Surrey, "Tax incentives as a device for implementing government policy: A comparison with direct  
government expenditures," (1970) 4(83) Harvard Law Review, 705. 
75  B I Bittker, "Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal Expenditures," (1973) XVI(2) 
The Journal of Law and Economics, 194.  
76  Surrey above n 74, p.705. 
77  Ibid, at p.711. 
78  Surrey describes the charitable deduction as intending to foster philanthropy.  In my recent submission to 
the Inland Revenue Department on the discussion document "Tax and charities," I described the proposal to 
increase rebates to individuals from $500 to $600 as parsimonious. 
79  D Diaz, "Taxing good works," The Independent, 8 August 2001, at 8.  
80  Surrey, above n 74, p.711. 
81  In Fiscal 1968, the revenue cost, in millions of dollars, being the cost of deductibility by individuals of 
charitable contributions, was: Health and Welfare $2,200; Education and Manpower $170. Surrey, above n 
74, p.710. 
82 Surrey, above n 74, p.713. 
 Centre of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies  Working Paper No. CPNS7 
 
10  
To balance the argument over tax incentives versus direct expenditure, Surrey also argues 
why direct expenditure programmes are superior to incentives, and that83: "… there should 
be at least [an] evaluation of the effectiveness and operation of the tax incentive."    
 
THE COURTS AND SUBSIDY THEORY 
 
Turning now to subsidy and charitable purposes in law, is it possible to find support for a 
direct relationship between charitable purpose and tax preferences?  In a very timely New 
Zealand decision, with respect to this conference, O'Regan J stated that84:  
 
In view of my finding that the Trust has more than one purpose and that one of those is 
not charitable, I find that the Trust is not entitled to the benefit of the income tax 
exemption set out in s 61(25) of the [Income Tax Act 1976 (ITA 1976)],85 for the 1994-
1996 income years. (O’Regan) 
 
Thus, with the stroke of another judicial pen, the nexus between tax preferences and 
charitable purpose is confirmed and this case is assigned to the slowly growing body of 
charitable case law in New Zealand.  For without charitable purpose, O'Regan J has 
confirmed that a trust cannot claim the privileges of tax exemption.  But how did this 
particular case arise, and why does a purpose which is not charitable make null and void the 
tax preference status when there is, as there was in this case, at least one purpose which is 
charitable?  
 
NON-CHARITABLE PURPOSE AS NULLIFYING TAX EXEMPTION 
 
I propose to now briefly explore the case on which O'Regan J made his pronouncement.  
The Crown Forestry Rental Trust (the Trust) was a statutorily appointed body, formed by a 
trust deed dated 30 April 1990, the settlors to the trust being the Minister of Finance and the 
Minister of State Owned Enterprises, acting pursuant to s 34 of the Crown Forest Assets Act 
1989.86  Summarising the background to the formation of the Trust, O'Regan J in his 
judgment outlined the historical events leading to the establishment of the Trust, particularly 
that87:  
 
The State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 precluded the Crown from effecting transfers of 
Crown assets until it had complied with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
 
The Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988 provided inter alia that all land 
transferred from the Crown to State-Owned Enterprises would carry a memorial 
recording that the land was subject to compulsory resumption for the settlement of 
Treaty of Waitangi claims. 
 
The Crown subsequently resolved to sell to private purchasers the Crown's commercial 
forestry assets other than the land on which the forest assets were located. 
 
An Agreement, dated 20 July 1989, provided for purchasers to make payment of an 
initial capital sum to the Crown, and an annual, market-based, rental for the use of the 
land. 
 
                                                          
83  Surrey, above n 74, p.738. 
84  Crown Forestry Rental Trust v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, High Court, Wellington, New Zealand, 7 
August 2001, CP No. 127/99 and CP No. 221/99 at 48, O'Regan J. 
85  The equivalent section is now s CB 4(1)(c) Income Tax Act 1994 (ITA 1994). 
86  Above n 84, at 4. 
87  Ibid, at p.4-6. 
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The annual rental was to be set aside in a fund administered by a Rental Trust. 
 
The interest (sic) earned by the investment of the rental proceeds was to be made 
available to assist Maori in the preparation, presentation and negotiation of claims 
before the Waitangi Tribunal which claims involved, or could involve, lands covered by 
the Agreement. 
 
The accumulated rental proceeds relating to a particular piece of land recommended 
for resumption, would be paid to the successful claimant, or alternatively, to the Crown. 
 
Legislative force was provided by the Crown Forest Assets Act 1989. 
 
Section 34 of the Crown Forest Assets Act 1989 provided at s 1 the establishment by 
Deed of a Forestry Rental Trust. 
 
All licence fees were to be collected by the Crown and held in an account in the name 
of the Forestry Rental Trust. 
 
The Deed describes the name of the trust as the Crown Forestry Rental Trust. 
 
At the time of incorporation, the Trust was not charitable - that status did not occur until 
subsequent events motivated the trustees to apply for charitable status.   
 
O'Regan J explored the nature of the Trust's activities, which in evidence given by the 
Secretary of the Trust, Ms Waterreus, indicated that88: "… the approach that the Trust has 
adopted to assist claimants has changed over time."  While O'Regan J stated that this was 
not an issue which he intended considering, surely this is one of the issues confronting 
charitable trusts where, as a consequence of their activities having changed from those of 
the founding trust deed, and where those activities may no longer be in accordance with the 
original trust deed, the trust's tax exempt status may be at risk?  One of the issues in New 
Zealand is that there is no monitoring of the activities of charitable organisations, let alone 
whether that task should be undertaken by the IRD or a Commission as in the UK.   
 
What O'Regan J did consider was how the purposes of the Trust might be established, by 
considering the terms of the Trust Deed as being the most important indicator of purpose, 
with reference to statute as well as the surrounding circumstances, to provide further 
certainty.89   This was not without difficulty with the consequence that90: 
 
… the inconsistency between the statements, the different purposes for which the 
publications in which the statements appear are used, the different audiences to which 
those publications are directed and the non-technical nature of the discussion in the 
publications, means [that] they do not assist me in determining the key legal issues in 
this case. (O’Regan) 
 
In addition to determining the purpose of the Trust, O'Regan J also had to determine whether 
s 61(25) ITA 197691 applied to income of the trust.  O'Regan J accepted the arguments of the 
Commissioner's counsel that92:  
 
                                                          
88  Ibid, at p.9. 
89  Ibid, at p.15. 
90  Ibid, at p.18. 
91  Now s CB 4(1)(c) ITA 1994. 
92 Above n 84, at p.20. 
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… the correct interpretation of s 61(25) ITA 1976 is that it applies to income which is 
derived by a trust established for charitable purposes.  Accordingly the focus of the 
inquiry as to the application of s 61(25) in this case is on the purposes of the trust, not 
the purposes of the income derived by the Trust. 
 
Returning to the purpose of the Trust, the question of whether the Trust had more than one 
purpose and if any of those purposes were not charitable, O'Regan J concluded that93:  
 
… the Trust has two distinct purposes (… assisting the defined class of Maori 
claimants and refers to the income of the Trust, while the second is of receiving the 
rental proceeds from the Licences, holding them, investing them and distributing them 
to the appropriate 'Confirmed Beneficiary' following a decision in respect of any 
Licensed Land by the Waitangi Tribunal) and that neither is ancillary or subordinate to 
the other, [and] that the 'receive and hold/stakeholder purpose' is not a charitable 
purpose.  The Trust does not therefore fall within s 61(25). 
 
The Trust, which was established on 30 April 1990,94 applied for charitable status in 1997 as 
a consequence of the withdrawal of a ruling by the IRD that had previously allowed the Trust 
to deduct expenditure on assisting claimants, effectively giving the Trust a nil tax position.  
Prior to the withdrawal of that ruling, there had been no need for the Trust to consider 
charitable status, a point acknowledged by O'Regan J.95   
 
This raises an interesting question with respect to the purpose of tax preferences for 
charities.  Does this mean that any entity, previously having a nil tax position, on being 
challenged by the IRD, can then seek charitable status?  Is this not an abuse of the privilege 
of tax exempt status accorded to those charitable organisations which, when they were 
established, sought and were granted IRD approval of their tax status?  If the entity was not 
charitable on being formed, why should it seek charitable status purely as a consequence of 
a change in its tax position?  Is it the intention of the Income Tax Act 1994 to provide a 
further means of tax avoidance if the tax vehicle currently being used, fails?  Does this mean 
that a trust is able to change its activities to direct them towards a situation which will provide 
a convenient tax exempt vehicle?  
 
THE CHANGING NATURE OF CHARITY 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Trust lost its exemption due to it having a non charitable 
purpose, the case is significant in that it reveals the changing nature of charitable purpose in 
the modern world.  O'Regan J concluded (obiter) that96:  
 
… the Trust's purpose of assisting the defined class of Maori claimants is a charitable 
purpose, and that if the "assistance" purpose had been the Trust's exclusive purpose, 
the Trust would have been entitled to the income tax exemption under s 61(25). 
(O’Regan) 
 
The authority for this statement seems to be a 1961 case in which it was held that97: "… the 
Arawa Tribe was a 'fluctuating body of private individuals' because the members of the 
Arawa Tribe were those tracing their ancestry to a person living in a defined area prior to 
1840."  The consequence of this case was98: "… the passing of s 24B of the Maori Trust 
                                                          
93  Ibid, at p.29. 
94  Ibid, at p.17. 
95  Ibid, at p.46. 
96  Ibid, at p.45. 
97  Arawa Maori Trust Board v CIR  (1961) 10 MCD 391; Ibid, at 42. 
98  Above n 84, at p.42. 
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Boards Act 1955,99 which allowed charitable status to certain trusts established by Maori 
Trust Boards."  
 
Furthermore, the argument that the meaning of charity is changing over time is supported by 
the House of Lords which, as described by Luxton, recognises that100:  "… with changes in 
the law, and with the increase of knowledge, the meaning of charity can change over time."   
The changes in the law Luxton refers to are as a consequence of the analogous approach 
taken by the courts when attempting to determine the existence of charitable purpose.101  
This approach is leading to absurd results, as demonstrated by the recent decision of a 
Canadian court which held that102: "… the provision of Internet facilities was charitable, as 
the Internet was a form of super-highway and therefore analogous to 'the repair of … 
highways' in the Preamble."  Can we now take this to mean that salaries earned by 
academics should be exempt from tax in their hands, being as they are for "the maintenance 
… of scholars in universities"?   This is unlikely, as the House of Lords acknowledged that 
the process of analogy was stretching "… the spirit and intendment of the Preamble almost 
to breaking point"103 and arguably, beyond. 
 
Further evidence, if it were needed, of this process of evolution, is contained in an earlier 
case from 1986 in the US, where the Court of Special Appeals stated that104: 
 
A determination of whether an institution is charitable must include a careful 
examination of the stated purposes of the organization, the actual work being 
performed, the extent to which the work performed benefits the community and the 
public welfare in general, and the support provided by donations.  
 
In applying that test in his decision in that particular case Mr Young, inter alia, testified 
that105: 
 
(1) [the] appellee's stated purpose of "providing mental health services and a 
substance abuse facility" was not a charitable purpose; 
(2) the actual work performed was not charitable because it was paid for out of 
government funds; 
                                                          
99  Maori Trust Boards Act 1955, s. 24B. Trusts for charitable purposes- 
(1) Any Board may from time to time, in its discretion, execute under its seal a declaration of trust 
declaring that it shall stand possessed of any of its property, whether real or personal, upon trust for 
charitable purposes.  
(2) Any income derived by the Board from any property to which the declaration relates shall be applied 
for such purposes referred to in section 24 (Functions of Board) or section 24A (Additional grants and 
payments by Board) of this Act as may be specified in the declaration of trust; and, for the purposes of 
the [Income Tax Act 1976], any such income shall be deemed to be income derived by trustees in trust 
for charitable purposes. 
(3) No declaration of trust under this section shall have any force or effect unless it as been approved by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue. 
100  P Luxton, "Four Centuries of the Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth," (2001) 78 New Law Journal Easter 
Charities Appeals, 9, referring to National Anti-Vivisection Society v IRC [1948] AC 31, 74 (Lord 
Simonds); Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426, 443 (Lord Simonds). 
101  Ibid, at p.10. 
102  Vancouver Regional Freenet Association v Minister of National Revenue (1996) 137 DLR 4th 406 
(Canadian Federal Court of Appeal) cited in Luxton, above n 101, at p.12. 
103  Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society v Glasgow City Corporation [1968] AC 138,153 (Lord 
Upjohn) cited in Luxton, above n 100, at p.14. 
104  Supervisor of Assessments v Group Health Association, Inc., 308 Md. 151 (1986) at 157, cited in State 
Department of Assessments and Taxation v North Baltimore Center, Inc., Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, No. 5469 September Term, 1998 at 4. 
105  Ibid. 
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(3) it did not benefit the general public because the government was paying a fee for 
service; and 
(4) the appellee received no significant private donations. 
 
THE ORIGINS OF TAX PREFERENCES 
 
Tax preferences are often justified on both altruistic and economic grounds.  Commonly they 
are justified on economic grounds as encouraging support for programmes that governments 
may not necessarily wish to fund.  The standard argument in favour of tax concessions on 
donations to charities is that via an income and a price effect, tax concessions increase the 
level of giving and donors' satisfaction there-from.106  According to Surrey107: "Many of the 
tax expenditures were expressly adopted to induce action, which the US Congress 
considered in the national interest, and as such, the charitable deduction was intended to 
foster philanthropy." However, policymakers "…did not at the outset express a rationale for 
any of these exemptions, and a variety of rationales are now articulated to defend them."108 
 
Few recorded expressions exist of legislative intent for enacting a tax benefit for charity.  A 
rare exception appears in the legislative history to the US Congress' 1938 decision that 
charity begins at home, the House Ways and Means Committee stating109: 
 
The bill provides that the deduction … be also restricted to contributions made to 
domestic institutions.  The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to 
charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is 
compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would 
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits 
resulting from the promotion of general welfare. 
 
But what were the origins of such incentives?  It seems that they were developed particularly 
as a device to encourage support for funding the costs of war.  In Canada, the very first 
income tax was The Income War Tax Act 1917,110  which provided for an exemption and 
deduction, without limit, for "…amounts paid by the taxpayer during the year for the Patriotic 
and Red Cross Funds, and other patriotic and war funds approved by the Minister."111  In 
1920, the war fund deduction was repealed.112  It was during the passing of the legislation to 
repeal The Income War Tax Act 1917 that for the first and only time, the justifiability or 
advisability of a general charitable donation deduction was debated by Parliament.113 
 
A similar event occurred in the UK in 1929, following the 1918 Royal Commission to study 
the income tax system.114  In 1930 the first general deduction for charitable donations 
became available to both corporate and individual taxpayers, as a response to the effects of 
                                                          
106  J Rowe, "Taxation Issues" in Performance without profit: The voluntary welfare sector in New Zealand,  
(eds. G R Hawke and D. Robinson), Institute of Policy Studies, 1993, p.59. 
107  S Surrey, "Tax incentives as a device for implementing government policy: A comparison with direct 
government expenditures," (1970) 4(83) Harvard Law Review,  711. 
108  E Brody, "Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption"(1998) 23(4) The 
Journal of Corporation Law, 587. 
109  Ibid. 
110  7-8 Geo 5, c.28 (Can.). 
111  The Income War Tax Act 1917, s 3(1)(c). 
112  An Act to Amend the Income War Tax Act 1917, 1920, 10-11 Geo 5, c.49 (Can.), s 5. 
113  The outcome of the debate was not reported. 
114  Report of Royal Commission on the Income Tax (Cmd. 615, 1920) (the Colwyn Commission), at 615, and 
the UK Royal Commission on the Income Tax, Memorandum by the Board of Inland Revenue on the 
Subject of the Exemption from Income Tax Enjoyed by Charities in Instalment of the Minute of Evidence, 
(London: HMSO, 1920), Appendix 31, cited in N Brooks, Charities: The Legal Framework (Ottawa: 
Secretary of State, 1983) [unpublished], at 25. 
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the Great Depression on the country's economic and social problems.  This deduction was 
inspired by the US, whose deduction regime had been in place since 1917.115 
 
The origins of the charitable exemption are of interest, as today the exemption is taken for 
granted by donors, donee's and governments alike and probably no thought is given to its 
origins.  In the US, according to Hall and Colombo,116 both the IRS and many states adopt a 
per se view of the exemption which is derived from "an impressive and ancient lineage in the 
law of charitable trusts." The charitable exemption was first enacted in 1894 as part of the 
original US income tax law, thus "… lifting the concept of charity whole cloth from the 
established body of precedent."117   
 
It is particularly interesting, in the light of the title of this paper, to read that118: "… 
commentators have generally ignored, or at least failed to explain, the relationship between 
[the] body of [charitable] law and the rationale for tax exemption" (emphasis added).  
Mancino observed that119: "academicians have overlooked the common law of charitable 
trusts." Thompson maintained that120: "… IRS decisions have 'blurred' the meaning of charity 
by departing from [the] body of common law precedent."  Hall and Colombo state that121: 
"Charitable trust law serves a wholly different purpose than the charitable exemption, 
[therefore] the trust definition of charity does not properly identify activities that deserve tax 
support." Charitable trust law exists "primarily to protect assets which founders choose to 
devote to worthy causes [and consequently] it covers a far broader subject matter than is 
deserving of a tax exemption."122   
 
In pondering such questions while writing this essay, it occurred to me that it is possible, in 
New Zealand at least, to establish a charitable trust without giving any thought to the 
possible economic effect, by way of tax preferences, nor of the social effects of such trusts. If 
one wishes to form a public company and to solicit funds from the public, one is required to 
prepare a prospectus and to issue an investment statement in accordance with the 
requirements of the Securities Act 1978.  Yet, in order to solicit funds from the public for 
charitable purposes, no such requirement exists.  Given that a charitable organisation exists 
for all intents and purposes in perpetuity, the long-term tax expenditure charge on 
governments must be considerable.   
 
Charities exist, amongst other reasons, to fulfil functions that government may not otherwise 
fund, so there is an economic financial advantage to society through the function of charities.  
The rapid growth of charities in countries such as China and Eastern Europe bears support 
for that contention.123  In 1999, the New Zealand Government 'paid' rebates of $NZ79m to 
some 491,000 donors.124 Assuming that these were for donations in the qualifying range of 
$5 to $1,500, this means that those donors contributed of the order of $NZ118m to New 
Zealand charities.  There will also be many donors who contributed to charity but who did not 
                                                          
115  R M  Bird, and M W Bucovetsky, Canadian Tax Reform and Private Philanthropy, Canadian Tax 
Foundation, Toronto,1976 at 16, and G McGregor, "Charitable Contributions," (1961) 9 Canadian Tax 
Journal, 448. 
116  M A  Hall and J Colombo, "The charitable status of nonprofit hospitals: Toward a donative theory of tax 
exemption" (1991) 66(287) Washington Law Review, 332. 
117  Ibid, at p.332. 
118  Ibid, at p.332. 
119  Mancino, "Income Tax Exemption of the Contemporary Nonprofit Hospital" (1988) 32(1015) St. Louis  
University Law Journal, p. 1017-18, cited in Hall and Colombo, above n 116, at p.332. 
120  Thompson, "The Unadministrability of the Federal Charitable Tax Exemption: Causes, Effects and 
Remedies" (1985) 5(1) Va. Tax Review, 12-13, cited in Hall and Colombo, above n 116, at p.332. 
121  Hall and Colombo, above n 116, at p.335. 
122  Ibid, at p.335. 
123  This is evident from various articles the author has read in recent months. 
124  D Diaz, Taxing good works, The Independent, 8 August 2001 at 8. 
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claim their rebates - known as "non-itemisers" in the US.  Therefore, the New Zealand 
Government, in 1999, "saved" $NZ39m in direct grants expenditure, being the difference 
between the donations received by charities and the rebates paid by government.  This is 
assuming that the NZ Government would have directly funded those charities to the full 
extent in lieu of donations made by individuals and those donating over $NZ1500.  
 
Hall and Colombo further stated that125: "No societal resources are committed to funding 
[charitable trusts] in contrast to the effects of a tax exemption."  Further,126  "…[There is] no 
test to ascertain when the exemption is either deserved or proportionate to the benefit 
society receives."  Therefore127:  "… binding the law of tax exemption to the same category of 
activities covered by charitable trust law is … manifestly absurd." 
 
HOW DOES THE NZ INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT DETERMINE TAX 
PREFERENCE STATUS? 
 
The process adopted by the IRD for approving tax exemption and donee status is very 
straightforward.  Providing that the charity can demonstrate, through its trust deed, 
compliance with one of the four heads of Pemsel's case, approval is given without further 
investigation into the economic and social benefits of the charity, either at the time the 
exemption is granted or at a later date.  This approach is not unlike Canada, where the 
question of which organisations qualify for charitable status is determined by the Ministry of 
National Revenue through its federal agency, Revenue Canada.128  Revenue Canada has 
been criticised as relying too heavily on common law interpretations of the Charitable Uses 
Act 1601 and by failing to give sufficient attention to the changing composition and evolving 
social needs of Canadian society.129  The Executive Director of Volunteer Canada believes 
that it has been more difficult to get charitable status, and nearly impossible since the 1990s, 
"because the federal government has increased tax benefits for donors to charity [and] it has 
been more reluctant to forgo revenue by expanding the pool of charities" (emphasis 
added).130 
 
Does this situation mean that in Canada, when approving charitable exemptions, Revenue 
Canada  undertakes an exercise in order to ascertain potentially forgone revenue, or is it 
merely a perception as to the reason why it is difficult to achieve tax exemption status? 
 
Hall and Colombo131 provide an answer through their proposal of certain criteria for 
evaluating theories of exemption, which should: 
 
(1) identify activities deserving social subsidy, which entails a determination of 
both worthiness and neediness; 
(2) distribute the subsidy in rough proportion to the degree of deservedness; 
(3) explain both the income tax and property tax exemption and, ideally, explain 
the related charitable deduction as well as the various operational constraints 
that attach to charitable status; and, 
(4) align generally with an intuitive concept of what constitutes a charity and the 
major historical categories of exempt activities. 
 
                                                          
125  Hall and Colombo, above n 116, at p.337. 
126  Ibid, at p.340. 
127  Ibid, at p.340.  
128  S G Greene, "Canadians Spar Over Who Should Decide What Constitutes a Charity" (1998), The Chronicle 
of Philanthropy, Thursday, August 27. 
129  Ibid. 
130  Ibid. 
131  Hall and Colombo, above n 116, at p.328. 
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Elaborating on their theory, Hall and Colombo state that in evaluating theories of exemption, 
the following  should be taken into account132: 
 
Deservedness: The exemption is justified only where there is a convincing [argument] 
showing that the activity in question deserves a social subsidy; the definition of charity 
should identify activities whose social benefits would be irreplaceably reduced absent 
the subsidy. 
 
Proportionality: An ideal concept of charity in the tax exemption arena should guard 
against oversubsidising (or undersubsidising) those activities that are deserving.  It is 
not enough to demonstrate that charitable institutions deserve government support; it is 
necessary to show that tax subsidies represent the most sensible vehicle for support, 
that some form of direct grant might not more accurately approximate the optimal level 
of support, or that direct government provision of the same service is not preferable. 
 
Universality: Classification as a charitable organisation carries with it not only 
exemption from the federal corporate income tax but also a host of other benefits and 
responsibilities: 
 
 eligibility to receive tax deductible donations under § 170(c) IRC (1989); 
 exemption from state and local property income, and sometimes sales tax; 
 earnings may not inure to the benefit of a private individual; 
 it may not engage in substantial political lobbying or in any political 
campaigning; 
 the exemption does not extend to earnings derived from activities unrelated to 
its exempt purpose. 
 
Historical consistency: The charitable exemption has evolved through centuries of 
experience to take on an almost universal presence and shape. (Hall and Colombo) 
 
It seems that these criteria would be an excellent template for the NZ IRD to apply when 
considering tax preferences for charitable organisations seeking to benefit from the privileges 
of charitable status. 
 
The concept of charitable purposes continues to evolve in the courts of law around the world.  
I have demonstrated that the Canadian courts have held the provision of Internet facilities to 
be charitable.  Is this a case where Mr Bumble would also have said,  "If the law supposes 
that, the law is a (sic) ass - a idiot."133  Or to quote George Chapman134: "I am ashamed the 
law is such an ass."  The process being applied by the courts is epitomised in the saying "A 
precedent embalms a principle"135 in that in the process of developing the law of charitable 
purpose when considering tax preference issues, the ripples from the pebble which was 
originally the Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth, four hundred years ago, are spreading 
wider and wider without consequence for the boundaries of the pond in which they were 
created.    
 
                                                          
132  Ibid, at p.328. 
133  C Dickens, "Oliver Twist" (1838). (Source not cited.) 
134  G Chapman, c. 1559-1634, "Revenge for Honour III.ii" quoted in The Oxford Dictionary of English 
Proverbs, (1948),   Revised by Sir Paul Harvey, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 353. 
135  Lord Stowell 1745-1836: An opinion, while Advocate-General, 1788, quoted by Disraeli in the House of 
Commons, 22 February 1848, quoted in The Little Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, (1994), (ed. S 
Ratcliffe), University Press, Oxford, at 192. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
When the question of ascertaining charitable purpose arises in the courts, if charitable 
purpose can be ascertained by analogy to the Statute of Elizabeth 1601, tax exempt status is 
confirmed as of right.  This is without any forethought to the economic and social 
consequences of such decisions. This is not a deficiency of the law of charity per se, as the 
granting of tax exempt status arises as the result of decisions by government agencies which 
may not have the resources to be able to ascertain the social or the economic benefits of 
charitable status.   
 
The nexus between charitable purpose and tax preferences as determined by the courts is 
nebulous, and as a consequence, without a radical change in the thinking of the judiciary, 
and of those Governments who pass the charitable laws which the judiciary ultimately 
interpret, there will continue to be charitable organisations with vague purposes, such as 
maintaining the welfare of donkeys, accepted as being of a charitable nature and as equally 
deserving of tax preferences as charitable organisations established for those in need. 
  
